The plight of the Sudanese deserves our attention

While the world focuses on the turmoil in the Middle East and remains alert to the perils in Ukraine, the tragedy in Sudan not only persists but is also, regrettably, often overlooked by mainstream media. However, public negligence affects conflicts where the effectiveness of international humanitarian law in protecting civilian populations from the horrors of war faces political barricades. This includes the conflicts in the Congo, Burkina Faso, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as other armed crises around the world. This situation prompts an important question: which conflict deserves our full attention? The answer is simple: every single one of them. 

Sudan's civil war, which began in April, continues to wreak havoc. The recent escalation of conflicts has compelled thousands of civilians to flee Wad Madani, the country's second-largest city, now on the brink of witnessing consistent civilian abuse. Seven million people have been internally displaced, while another million have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Over 10,000 people have died, and credible accounts of appalling atrocities have surfaced. Nearly 20 million people are facing acute food insecurity. Let's pause for a moment and reflect on these numbers. Let's ask ourselves why, as a 21st century civilisation, we cannot use our collective consciousness to give Sudan the attention it so desperately needs. 

A recurring narrative among many Sudanese women, particularly mothers, speaks of traumatic experiences in which their husbands—the fathers of their children—were forcefully taken from their homes, only to face brutal execution in the streets of a country that seems unable to escape relentless civil infighting. Other harrowing stories involve the murder of children and Sudan's emergence as the world's largest child displacement hub, with over three million children fleeing the war. To make matters worse, more than 3,130 severe child rights violations have been reported, with Darfur—a region in Western Sudan—accounting for at least half of these incidents. 

Many in the international community view the situation in Darfur as bearing the hallmarks of ethnic cleansing. In Khartoum, the capital city located in the eastern part of the country, severe devastation is unfolding, transforming it into a battlefield. Extensive damage to residential and public buildings, many of which have been set ablaze, has rendered them nearly uninhabitable. Infrastructure, including medical services, is on the verge of total collapse. The provision of essential services to civilians has failed, and as the war continues, more than six million people, a notable proportion being children, face the threat of a famine for which no international public policy response will suffice. Humanitarian aid is struggling to reach those in need, and in some areas like Khartoum, the United Nations and its affiliated agencies have little to no physical presence, with only a few non-governmental organisations operating there. 

As one of Africa's largest countries by landmass, Sudan, with a population of 46 million, has been under military rule since its independence in 1946. Omar Al Bashir, who governed the country for thirty years, adopted a draconian governance approach, laying the foundations of the current crisis. Fearing a coup from within his own military, Bashir empowered the Janjaweed, an Arab militia group with a notorious human rights record, to counterbalance the power of his own army and serve as counter-insurgency forces against rebels opposing him in the early 2000s. This militia faced accusations of mass rape and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, acts labelled as genocide by the United States. 

Over time, the Janjaweed were formally integrated into the Sudanese military infrastructure and renamed the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group reporting directly to Bashir. It changed in 2019 when Bashir was deposed by the army, supported by civilian protests. Following the emergence of the Rapid Support Forces as a dominant political entity, marked by their overarching control of Sudan's richest gold mines and subsequent gold exports to Dubai, as well as their roles as mercenaries in Yemen and Libya, their international clout has increased exponentially. Despite accusations that Russia, particularly via the infamous Wagner Group, and the United Arab Emirates are providing full-fledged economic and military backing to the Rapid Support Forces, both countries have issued denials. However, this situation does not in any way, shape, or form exist in isolation from broader geopolitical interests and patterns. International actors are silently but surely invested in Sudan for self-serving motives, as detailed extensively by The Guardian's Jason Burke in April 2023.

The UAE's involvement is driven mostly by a desire to outcompete other Middle Eastern nations and to secure financial benefits from Sudan. Similarly, Moscow, continuing its pattern of supporting notorious militia-style disruptors for both financial and political gains, has long backed the Rapid Support Forces. This mirrors Russia's tactics throughout the Sahel and other parts of Africa, where they often take steps to enhance prevailing chaos with an unprecedented amount of disinformation. Their strategic interests also extend to the Indian Ocean. Here, Sudan, bordered by the Red Sea to the east, lies close to maritime routes that link the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—positioning Sudan as a strategic location for seeking naval bases, in a move reminiscent of Russia's Mediterranean ambitions in Syria.

Saudi Arabia's engagement is motivated by a need to surpass regional competitors and exploit Sudan's extensive agricultural resources. Egypt's endorsement of the military regime in Sudan, which is engaged in conflict with the Rapid Support Forces, and specifically the current government led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, aligns with Cairo's preference for stability engineered by the armed forces, reflecting its own governance model. China is focused on gaining an upper hand against the United States, acquiring support within the United Nations, and seeking diplomatic distinction through successful mediation of aid disseminating to Sudan. These trends extend outwards to Western European countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States, each having their own interests, even if they do not openly support specific factions. 

Let us get something straight: Sudan's conflict is predominantly not ideological. Radical Islamic elements are present but not central. Neither Mohamed Dagalo, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces, nor Burhan have articulated distinct political ideologies. The United States, while investing in a rudimentary communications campaign of calling for human rights and moral values to be protected, are principally concerned with preventing threats to their interests from potential state failure in Sudan. The crux of this conflict lies in a violent and chaotic competition for tactical gains, involving a range of participants—warlords, opportunists, exploiters, and sovereign nations—with varying motives, regardless of their attire. This war, with actors in suits, robes, and military regalia, reflects one chapter of the wider geopolitical struggles of our time. 

There is an intense sense of frustration among human rights advocates regarding the Biden administration's apparent reluctance to exert sufficient political and public influence on the UAE—a key historic and strategic ally of Washington in what is the most complex geopolitical environment in the Middle East in recent years. This concern is heightened by accusations that the UAE is covertly, and illegally, providing arms and ammunition to the Rapid Support Forces, potentially violating United Nations arms embargoes on Darfur. Such actions are believed to be fuelling the Rapid Support Forces' campaign of heinous acts of mass rape and ethnic cleansing against Sudanese civilians.

The Rapid Support Forces' military strength is undeniable, having made significant territorial gains in and around Khartoum and Darfur. This trend is expected to continue in the coming days, with The Economist describing the Rapid Support Forces as a genocidal militia that is clearly winning the war in Sudan. An ethnic dimension to this conflict also warrants special attention. The Rapid Support Forces and allied Arab militias stand accused of targeting specific ethnic groups, particularly the Masalit people, who are considered as black Africans, in contrast to the predominantly Arab composition of the Rapid Support Forces.

In 2003, the Janjaweed, who were the forerunners of the Rapid Support Forces, targeted El Geneina, the historical capital of the Masalit people. Fast forward to 2023, a Sudanese army base in El Geneina has fallen to the Rapid Support Forces. Independently verified images show Rapid Support Forces fighters celebrating at the base. Reports of ethnically-motivated atrocities against civilians have emerged in the area, with the United Nations expressing extreme alarm over the killing of hundreds of Masalit civilians by the Rapid Support Forces. Again, this is expected to continue at a scale which should concern one and all. 

Sudan is not the only casualty of its ongoing crisis. The Nile Valley, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel-Sahara region are slated to be pulled into this conflict. The large number of refugees fleeing Sudan is, mildly put, a recipe for disaster. This mounting refugee crisis threatens to further destabilise the region. If anything, it is symbolic of a cycle of violence in many parts of Africa which regular people have paid little attention to. If the Rapid Support Forces prevail in Sudan, neighboring countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea could be dragged into an inescapable regional conflict of colossal proportions, with initial signs already visible.

Notwithstanding these risks, Sudan's civil war continues unabated, with intensified fighting in Wad Madani and the sight of fleeing civilians underscoring the futility of any and all local, regional, or international efforts to end the war. Throughout this turmoil, there can be no winners. More loss of human life will occur. Sudan is crumbling as a functioning state. Unfortunately, the ability and willingness of the powers that be, not for any other reason but to create a framework of peace through international policy instruments, are limited. 

Sudan needs assistance from the international community—and it needs it very quickly. Specifically, Sudan needs more financial relief packages, medical aid, food supplies, and a committed transnational effort towards establishing peace, starting with not just a ceasefire in name only, but a permanent one. How the country can get to that stage where the government and the Rapid Support Forces are willing to focus on negotiations, remains unclear. Experts are concerned that the conflict will only worsen as the Rapid Support Forces gain more ground. They argue that without diplomatic intervention from the West, particularly the United States, there is little hope for meaningful peace talks. By the time such realization dawns upon the opposing parties in Sudan, and to an extent, upon superpowers, Sudan may be, as it has been in the past, decimated to an extent that even the process of rebuilding will be marred by further cycles of civilian unrest and civil conflicts. 

Aftab Ahmed is a public policy columnist and an Urban Fellow Researcher with the City of Toronto.

Views expressed in this article are the author's own.

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